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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes health plan choices of retirees in an employer-sponsored health benefits program
that resembles "premium support" models proposed for Medicare. In this program, out-of-pocket
premiums depend on when an individual retired and his or her years of service as of that date. Since
this price variation is exogenous to unobserved plan attributes and retiree characteristics, it possible
to obtain unbiased premium elasticity estimates. The results indicate a significantly negative effect
of premiums. The implied elasticities are at the low end of the range found in previous studies on
active employees.
Thomas C. Buchmueller






In recent years, a number of proposals have been made to reorganize Medicare by placing a
greater emphasis on market-based competition among health insurance plans.1 In contrast
to the current system of administrative pricing, payments to health plans in these “managed
competition” or “premium support” models would be based on competitive bidding. The
government’s contribution toward coverage would be set so as to expose beneﬁciaries to
diﬀerences in premiums charged by competing plans. Individuals choosing a more costly plan
would be required to pay the diﬀerence between the plan’s premium and the government
contribution. Advocates of market-oriented reform argue that these ﬁnancial incentives will
cause beneﬁciaries to migrate to lower cost plans, which, in turn, will create a strong incentive
for plans to control costs in order to compete on price.
To assess the potential impact of market-oriented reform proposals, it is necessary to
understand the price sensitivity of Medicare beneﬁciaries. While a number of studies examine
the eﬀect of premiums on the choice among alternative health plans, this literature has largely
focused on the behavior of non-elderly employees. An obvious concern is that the results
from these studies may not generalize to the Medicare population. In particular, there are
several reasons to suspect that older consumers may be more reluctant to switch health
insurers and less sensitive to price than younger workers.
This study investigates the eﬀect of premiums on the health insurance decisions of retirees
in a setting that resembles prominent Medicare reform proposals. The analysis is based on six
years of data from a large employer that oﬀers its retirees several health insurance options.
Like many employers, in the mid-1990s this company changed its policies concerning the
ﬁnancing of these insurance options. Whereas it had previously paid the full amount for each
retiree’s insurance, the amount the ﬁrm now contributes toward a retiree’s coverage depends
1The most prominent examples are proposals that came out of the National Bipartisan Commission on The
Future of Medicare. In 1999, the majority of the Commission’s members supported a market-oriented reform
proposal, though this proposal did not achieve the super-majority necessary for a formal recommendation.
Subsequent legislative proposals include bills authored by the chairmen of the Commission, Senator John
Breaux and Congressman Bill Thomas and more recent legislation proposed by Breaux and Senator Bill
Frist (S. 357). These bills have important similarities to reform strategies advocated by academic health
economists and other policy analysts. For example, see Enthoven (1988), Aaron and Reischauer (1995),
Butler and Moﬃt (1995) and Dowd, Feldman and Christianson (1996).2
on when the person retired and her years of service at that point. Because otherwise similar
retirees who either retired at diﬀerent times or at the same time with diﬀerent years of service
face very diﬀerent relative prices for the same menu of health plans, this policy creates an
ideal natural experiment for estimating the eﬀect of price on health plan choices. Changes
over time in the employer contribution and plan premiums create additional price variation
that is also plausibly exogenous to other health plan attributes and retiree characteristics
that are likely to aﬀect the demand for insurance.
Using these data, I estimate conditional logit models of the health plan choice decision.
I ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of price on the probability a health plan
is chosen by retirees. The results are robust to alternative assumptions concerning the
deﬁnition of the choice set and to changes in the composition of the estimation sample.
The next section reviews the existing literature on the eﬀect of price on health plan
choice decisions. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and econometric methods, respectively.
Regression results are presented in the ﬁfth section. The sixth section concludes.
2 Previous Research on Health Plan Choice
A number of studies examine the eﬀect of out-of-pocket premiums on health plan choice deci-
sions, typically using data from a single employer and focusing on the decisions of employees
rather than retirees. A key methodological issue for this literature is the source of variation
in out-of-pocket premiums. When the variation comes entirely from diﬀerences across plans,
correlation between premiums and other unmeasured plan characteristics becomes a possible
source of bias. Barringer and Mitchell (1994) suggest that this type of omitted variable bias
is a likely explanation for their counterintuitive ﬁnding of a positive eﬀect of price in some
models. Similarly, in their cross-sectional analysis of data from the Federal Employee Health
Beneﬁt Program, Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) ﬁnd that the estimated eﬀect of premiums is
very sensitive to the inclusion of other plan characteristics in the regression model.
The most convincing evidence on premium elasticities comes from studies that rely on
within-plan diﬀerences in employer premium contributions for identiﬁcation. Feldman et al.
(1989) use data from 17 Twin Cities ﬁrms that oﬀer an overlapping set of health plans to3
their employees. In this data set diﬀerences in employer contribution policies mean that
diﬀerent individuals face diﬀerent prices for the same plans. Three other studies analyze
the eﬀect of price diﬀerences generated by changes in a single employer’s contributions from
one year to the next. Cutler and Reber (1998) examine the eﬀects of a change in Harvard
University’s health plan contribution policy that changed out-of-pocket premiums for em-
ployees over a two year period. The employee response to the price change in the ﬁrst year
implies an “enrollee perspective” premium elasticity of -0.3. The response in the second year
implies an elasticity of -0.6. Royalty and Solomon (1999) analyze two years of data from
Stanford University. Their conditional logit results imply enrollee perspective elasticities
in the same range; results using a ﬁxed eﬀect logit speciﬁcation imply even stronger price
eﬀects. Strombom et al. (2002) estimate premium elasticities using data on employees of
the University of California (UC). The range of their elasticity estimates is similar to those
of the two earlier studies.
There are reasons to expect Medicare beneﬁciaries to be less sensitive to health insurance
premiums than the active employees analyzed in these studies. Research on how the elderly
perceive health insurance options suggests they place much more importance on factors such
as quality of care, freedom of referral, and the burden of paperwork than on premiums (Harris
1997; Harris and Keane 1999). Thus, to the extent that Medicare beneﬁciaries view plan
alternatives as being diﬀerentiated along these other dimensions, their choices will be less
strongly inﬂuenced by diﬀerences in premiums. Experimental research ﬁnding that elderly
consumers are more likely to treat health insurance premiums as a signal of quality (Uhrig
and Short 2002/2003) also points to a negative relationship between age and price sensitivity.
An additional reason to expect older consumers to have a less elastic demand for health
insurance comes from the fact that health insurance decisions are subject to persistence and
“status quo bias” (Neipp and Zeckhauser 1985; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). To the
extent that older consumers face higher “switching costs,” they will be less willing than
younger individuals to change plans in response to a change in relative prices. In particular,
Medicare beneﬁciaries with strong ties to certain providers may be reluctant to switch from
one managed care plan to another if it means also having to change providers or to risk an
interruption in treatment.4
The results of several studies suggest the importance of switching costs in health insurance
decisions. Strombom et al. (2002) estimate separate premium elasticities for 18 mutually
exclusive groups of employees hypothesized to diﬀer in terms of the cost of switching health
plans. Consistent with the switching cost hypothesis, they ﬁnd that price sensitivity declines
with age and employment tenure and is lower for individuals with higher expected medical
care utilization. Royalty and Solomon (1999) obtain qualitatively similar results when they
test for diﬀerences in price sensitivity related to age, employment tenure and a diﬀerent
measure of health status. Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) also ﬁnd that new employees are
substantially more price sensitive to incumbent employees, and Beaulieu (2002) ﬁnds some
evidence that younger employees are more price sensitive than older ones.
While limited, direct evidence on the behavior of elderly consumers also suggests that
they are less sensitive to health plan premiums than younger consumers. In an earlier
study, I examine how retirees from the UC responded to changes in out-of-pocket premiums
caused by a change in the University’s premium contribution (Buchmueller 2000). The
results indicate that while changes in out-of-pocket premiums have a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the decision to switch plans during open enrollment, UC retirees are less price
sensitive than active employees who faced similar price changes. I also examine the eﬀect of
rising premium contributions on the percentage of retirees choosing fee-for-service Medigap
coverage rather than an HMO. The structure of this part of the analysis resembles the work
by Cutler and Reber (1998). The enrollee perspective elasticities for UC retirees range from
-0.12 to -0.24, which is smaller than the range of Cutler and Reber’s (1998) estimates.
Atherly, Dowd and Feldman (2004) use data from the 1998 Medicare Current Beneﬁciary
Survey (MCBS) to estimate premium elasticities for beneﬁciaries living in areas where more
than one HMO was available through the Medicare+Choice program. Since they exclude
from their analysis individuals with retiree health beneﬁts through a former employer, their
sample represents a diﬀerent subset of the Medicare population than the UC retirees. Dowd,
Feldman and Coulam (2003) conduct a similar analysis using aggregate (county-level) data
from 1999. The results from these two studies are quite similar to the results for UC retirees,
with estimated premium elasticities of -0.14 (Atherly, Dowd and Feldman) and -0.13 (Dowd,
Feldman and Coulam).5
Each of these studies on the plan choices of Medicare beneﬁciaries has signiﬁcant method-
ological limitations. Because in the UC data there was little price variation among HMOs,
the choice that is modeled is the decision to join the single PPO option or to enroll in one
of several HMOs. Consequently, the results may not apply well to the situation envisioned
by Medicare reform proponents, where there is price competition among multiple managed
care plans. This problem may be exacerbated by the fact that over half of UC retirees were
already in HMOs before there was a price diﬀerences between the HMOs and the PPO op-
tion. It may be that many of the PPO enrollees who faced the price increase had a strong
aversion to more tightly managed care and were therefore willing to pay substantially higher
prices rather than switch to an HMO. As a result, the UC results may understate the average
demand elasticity for the Medicare population.
Since the other two studies on Medicare beneﬁciaries are based on national data, it would
seem that they are not subject to the same concerns about generalizability as ones using
data from a single ﬁrm. However, because of numerous exclusions, the samples used are
not representative of the entire Medicare population either. In addition, there are other
potentially important methodological problems with each study. The most signiﬁcant one is
that because both use cross-sectional data all the variation in prices is across plans. Since
it is not possible to fully control for plan beneﬁts and other important plan characteristics
that may be correlated with price, omitted variable bias is a concern.2
This problem may be exacerbated by substantial ambiguity about the actual plan choice
of beneﬁciaries. It is common for HMOs that participate in Medicare to oﬀer multiple plans
that diﬀer in terms of both the extent of coverage and the premiums charged to beneﬁciaries.
Nearly 40% of HMO members in the MCBS data used by Atherly, Dowd and Feldman are
enrolled in HMOs oﬀering multiple options. It is not possible in either the MCBS or the
aggregate data used by Dowd, Feldman and Coulam to distinguish enrollment in a less
generous, lower cost option from enrollment in the more comprehensive and more costly
plan oﬀered by the same HMO. In these cases, both studies assign enrollment to the HMOs
2The expected direction of this bias is unclear. If more expensive plans oﬀer richer beneﬁts or contract
with more highly regarded providers, the correlation between price and plan quality will cause the eﬀect of
price to be biased toward zero. However, rules governing HMOs in Medicare may lead to a bias in the other
direction. During the period analyzed in these studies, plans in areas with high capitated payment rates
tended to oﬀer additional beneﬁts, such as richer drug coverage, and charged zero premiums.6
lower cost plan. It is not clear how this imputation aﬀects the estimated price eﬀects.3
These methodological problems do not arise arise in the data I use in this study. Because
of the way the employer’s premium contributions are set, there is substantial within plan
variation in out-of-pocket premiums. In addition, since I use administrative enrollment data
I know exactly what plans an individual was oﬀered, the out-of-pocket premiums for each
plan and which option was chosen. I turn now to the details of these data.
3 Data
3.1 The Sample
This analysis is based on administrative health plan data from an employer with roughly
2,700 employees located in the Southwestern United States. The data are for the years 1997
to 2002, during which time the number of retirees eligible for health beneﬁts grew from 924
to 1,244. Many of these are individuals who retired before age 65. There are arguments for
and against including these early retirees in the analysis. Since plan beneﬁts do not change
when a retiree becomes covered by Medicare, but the required premium contributions do,
pooling retirees above and below age 65 provides additional price variation. Including pre-
Medicare retirees also allows for larger sample sizes. On the other hand, to the extent that
younger retirees behave diﬀerently than older ones, the results may not generalize well to
the Medicare population. To mitigate these concerns, I exclude retirees under age 60 from
the analysis. To further reduce heterogeneity within the sample, I also exclude individuals
who retired before January 1986. These inclusion criteria result in a maximum sample size
of 3,230 observations on 724 retirees.
3.2 The Choice Set
In each year from 1997 to 2002, retirees and active employees had four health insurance
options to choose from: three health plans and a cash payment for declining coverage. Two
3In the study by Atherly, Dowd and Feldman, there is an additional measurement problem. While one
of the options they model is Medigap coverage, they lack good data on the Medigap premiums faced by
individuals in their sample.7
of the health plans are HMOs, which I will refer to as HMO A and HMO B in order to
maintain the anonymity of the employer providing the data.4 The other plan on the menu
is a PPO. For enrollees living in its service area, the PPO has a $250 per-person deductible,
a 10% coinsurance rate for providers in the plan’s network, and a 50% coinsurance rate for
non-network providers. For retirees outside the service area who use non-network providers,
the coinsurance rate is 20%.
While all employees and retirees have the option of declining coverage, the exact menu
of health plans depends on where an individual lives.5 Approximately two-thirds of retirees
face the full choice set, 7% face the choice of one HMO and a PPO option, and roughly
one-quarter choose between the PPO and the cash payment for declining coverage.
3.3 The Price Variable
What makes these data well suited for analyzing the eﬀect of price on the choice of health
plans is that there is substantial variation in premium contributions facing retirees sharing
a common choice set. Essentially, the data set combines the type of cross-sectional price
variation exploited by Feldman et al. (1989) with the intertemporal variation that is the basis
for the estimates by Cutler and Reber (1998), Royalty and Solomon (1999) and Strombom
et al. (2002).
The cross-sectional variation comes from the way that the employer’s contribution de-
pends on a retiree’s prior work history. The rules for determining the employer contribution
diﬀer across three groups of retirees: (1) those retiring on or before January 1, 1988; (2)
those retiring between January 2, 1988 and January 1, 1993; and (3) those retiring after
January 1, 1993. For the ﬁrst group, the employer contribution covers the full cost of all
plans. For individuals retiring between 1988 and 1993, the employer contribution depends on
coverage tier (i.e., single, two-party) and is set below the premium of the PPO, which is the
most costly plan. As a result, premiums vary by plan, coverage tier and Medicare status. All
4Both plans are headquartered in the same city as the employer, have long histories there and are similar
in other important respects. For example, they receive comparable scores on various quality “report card”
measures. In 2001, 14% of all Medicare beneﬁciaries in the county where the employer and the two plans
are located were enrolled in Plan A, and 12.4 % were enrolled in Plan B.
5Because the data I use comes from the same system that generates Open Enrollment materials sent to
employees and retirees, there is no ambiguity as to which plans are available to each individual.8
pre-1993 retirees who decline insurance coverage receive $75 per month. For individuals who
retired after January 1, 1993 the employer’s contribution decreases by a ﬁxed percentage for
each year of service less than 25.6 Thus, for this group, out-of-pocket premiums vary within
as well as across plans.
To give a sense of how the rules of the program lead to diﬀerences in relative prices, Table
1 presents the 2002 retiree premium contributions for diﬀerent retiree proﬁles. The data in
the top panel show that all plans are free for individuals who retired before January 1988. As
a result, these retirees represent a “control group” when considering the eﬀect of premiums
on health plan decisions. For individuals retiring between 1988 and 1993 (second panel),
out-of-pocket prices depend on coverage tier and Medicare status. In 2002, the diﬀerence
between the cost of the PPO and HMO B ranged from $27.24 ($65.49 - $38.25) for single,
pre-Medicare coverage to $144.81 for two-party Medicare coverage; the mean diﬀerence was
$70 per month.7 For Medicare beneﬁciaries in this cohort the 2002 prices for the two HMOs
are identical, while for pre-Medicare retirees Plan A requires a slightly larger contribution.8
The last two panels of Table 1 summarize the situation of post-1993 retirees with 20 and
10 years of service. For a single Medicare-eligible retiree with 20 years of service, the monthly
cost for the PPO is $82.54 more than the cost of the less expensive HMO. This amount is
larger than the diﬀerence facing an otherwise identical individual who retired between 1988
and 1993 ($50.24), but smaller than the diﬀerence for someone who retired at the same
time with only 10 years of experience ($147.13). For all post-1993 retirees HMO A is more
expensive than HMO B; this price diﬀerence is larger for retirees with fewer years of service.
One potential concern regarding the variation induced by the company’s premium contri-
bution policy is that it may have aﬀected the timing of some employees’ retirement decisions.
6Post-1993 retirees with 25 or more years of service receive the same contribution, and therefore face the
same prices, as retirees in the middle cohort. For post-1993 retirees with less than 25 years of service, the
out-of-pocket premium for plan j is Pj = Fj - C(1 - .04(25 - s)), where Fj is the plan’s full premium (i.e.,
what the health insurer charges the employer), C is the amount the employer contributes for the middle
group of retirees and s is the individual’s years of service at the time of retirement.
7This mean is calculated using the premium contributions corresponding to each individual’s chosen
coverage tier.
8Diﬀerences in the way the PPO and the two HMOs are underwritten lead to diﬀerences in the relationship
between premiums and coverage tier. For example, note that for the 1988-1993 retirement cohort there is no
diﬀerence in the PPO premium charged for a husband and wife who are both under age 65 and a husband
and wife where one person is on Medicare and the other is not. In contrast, these two types of couples face
diﬀerent HMO premiums.9
If such eﬀects were large, it would raise questions about the exogeneity of the price variable.
As it turns out, this is not an issue, since the change in the health insurance contribution
policy was enacted retroactively. An examination of the timing of retirements since 1985
suggests that, if anything, the company chose the retirement date cut-oﬀs to fall just before
spikes in retirement in the fourth quarter of 1988 and the second quarter of 1993 (data not
shown).
Additional variation comes from changes in the level of the employee contribution and
change in total premiums for the plans.9 For pre-1988 retirees premium contributions are
constant at zero throughout the time period analyzed, whereas relative prices have changed
over time for the other two cohorts. For most individuals in most years, the PPO option is
more expensive than the HMOs. The average diﬀerence between the contribution required
for the PPO and the price of the lowest cost HMO option declined from 1997 to 1999 and
has increased thereafter. Premiums have evolved diﬀerently for the two HMOs. In some
years they have the same price for all retirees, while in other years, like 2002, this is true for
some retirees but not others.
3.4 Covariates
The administrative data includes information on age, gender, marital status10 and whether
or not the covered individual is a surviving spouse of a former employee of the company.
As with most studies in this literature, other correlates of medical care utilization are not
available. As a result, it is not possible to test for diﬀerences in price-sensitivity related to
expected health care costs or to conduct other tests related to the problem of adverse risk
selection. However, the lack of health information does not pose problems for estimating
average elasticities for all retirees. Retiree income is also unobserved. As a proxy, I use
data from the 2000 Census on the ZIP-code level median income for households with heads
between the ages of 65 and 74. The data on ZIP code is also used to create an indicator
variable for retirees living outside of metropolitan areas. This variable enters the regression
9In the regression analysis, prices are normalized to 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
10Unlike data used in most prior studies, this is actual marital status, not simply whether or not the retiree
has chosen to cover a dependent spouse.10
models to account for the fact that HMO coverage will tend to be less attractive to individuals
living in rural areas.
Table 2 summarizes the observed characteristics of the retirees in the sample, stratiﬁed
by retirement date. The ﬁgures illustrate why I exclude individuals who retired before 1986.
They are substantially older and diﬀerent in other ways from the more recent retirement
cohorts. Since pre-1988 retirees face very diﬀerent prices than the later two cohorts, including
these older retirees would raise a concern that the estimated eﬀect of price would be biased
by unobserved heterogeneity. Individuals who retired between 1986 and 1988 are also older
than more recent retirees, though the diﬀerence is not large: their mean age is 69.7 years
compared to 68.2 for individuals retiring between 1988 and 1993. They are also similar to
the latter two cohorts in terms of the percent who are married and the percent who are male.
Individuals who retired between 1986 and 1988 are less likely to live in metropolitan areas
than members of the two later cohorts. Diﬀerences among the three cohorts in the ZIP code
level income variable are not signiﬁcant.
3.5 The Distribution of Plan Enrollment
To give a preliminary sense of how price aﬀects the health plan choices of these retirees,
Table 3 reports the distribution of plan enrollment for 2002 broken down by retirement
cohort. Overall, the PPO is the most popular plan, enrolling almost half of the retirees in
the sample. HMO B has a higher enrollment share than HMO A (32% vs: 13%); 9% of
the sample decline coverage. Diﬀerences across retiree cohorts suggests that price is a factor
aﬀecting health plan choice decisions. PPO enrollment is greatest for pre-1988 retirees, for
whom such coverage is “free” and is lowest for post-1993 retirees, who face the highest
prices for the PPO option. The inverse pattern is observed for the percentage of retirees
choosing HMO coverage. As would be expected, waiving is least common for pre-1988
retirees, though there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the other two cohorts in the percent
waiving coverage.11
11This latter result is partly explained by the fact that a larger share of the post-1993 retirees are under
age 65. As will be shown below, retirees who are not yet eligible for Medicare are less likely to waive coverage.11
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
I estimate premium elasticities based on a conditional logit regression model12 in which the
expected utility that individual i receives from plan j is assumed to be a linear function of
plan attributes and individual characteristics:
Vij = ¯Pij + Zij° + Xiµj + uij: (1)
The variable of primary interest is Pij, the price that individual i must pay for option j.
The vector Z represents other plan attributes. Since in these data the non-price attributes of
each plan (e.g., beneﬁts, provider panels, quality reputation) are the same for all individuals,
Z consists of a set of plan dummies13 plus a dummy variable that equals one for two-party
coverage and zero for single coverage.
The vector Xi includes individual characteristics that are assumed to be related to pref-
erences for the diﬀerent alternatives. Age enters as a continuous variable along with an
indicator variable that equals one for individuals who are under age 65 to account for the
fact that a person’s outside options change discretely when she qualiﬁes for Medicare. Since
a key source of price variation is across retirement cohorts, it is important to be sure that
the results are not sensitive to the treatment of age. For this reason, I also estimated models
where age was parameterized as a quadratic and with a set of categorical variables. Since
the estimated price elasticities are not at all sensitive to the way age enters the model, I
report the results from this more parsimonious and easily interpreted speciﬁcation. The
other control variables are the ZIP code level median income variable and indicator variables
for marital status, coverage as a surviving spouse of a former employee, and residence in a
12A well known limitation of this model is that it is subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) condition, which implies strong restrictions on the predicted substitution patterns. An alternative
model that is not subject to IIA is the “mixed logit” model (McFadden and Train 2000; Train 2003), which
allows utilities to be correlated across alternatives. I estimated several versions of mixed logit models incor-
porating diﬀerent distributional assumptions. While these alternative models performed slightly better than
the standard conditional logit model in terms of log-likelihood the models did not diﬀer in any meaningful
way in terms of the implied elasticities.
13Chernew et al (2002) interpret these dummies to represent consumers average assessment of plan quality.
It is likely that that they also pick up such things as provider panel size and the convenience of provider
locations.12
non-metropolitan county. The error term uij captures unobserved factors aﬀecting person
i’s assessment of option j.
There are two potentially important issues relating to the deﬁnition of the choice set. The
ﬁrst is that single and married retirees face a diﬀerent set of options. Whereas singles simply
choose from among the three plans and the option of waiving coverage, married retirees also
have the decision of whether or not to cover their spouse. Most previous studies have treated
the decision to cover dependents as exogenous to price and modelled the choice among plans
conditional on that decision (Feldman et al. 1989; Barringer and Mitchell 1994; Royalty and
Solomon 1999; Buchmueller 2000; Strombom et al. 2002). This assumption is reasonable in
cases where the employer contribution covers a large share of the cost of family coverage and,
therefore there, is little ﬁnancial disincentive to cover dependents. However, for many retirees
in this data set the incremental cost of covering a dependent spouse can be substantial and
approximately 16% of married retirees in the sample choose single coverage. Thus, treating
the choice of coverage tier as exogenous ignores one margin where price matters. Auxiliary
regressions of the decision of married retirees to cover a dependent spouse (conditional on
choosing a plan) indicates that this decision depends signiﬁcantly on the diﬀerence between
the price of two-party and single coverage. For this reason, I treat single and two-party
coverage from each plan as distinct choice alternatives. This means that for married retirees
the choice set has up to 7 alternatives (3 plans times 2 coverage tiers plus the waive option).
The second speciﬁcation issue pertains to the treatment of the option of waiving coverage.
Previous studies have not modelled the decision to decline coverage, presumably because in
the cases analyzed there is little ﬁnancial incentive to decline coverage, making such behavior
very rare. However, it is clear from Tables 1 and 3 that retirees in this data set both have an
incentive to decline coverage and appear to respond to that incentive. Therefore, I include
waiving as an option in the choice set. For the purpose of sensitivity testing and to allow
for clear comparisons with previous work, I also estimate models on a restricted sample of
individuals who chose to enroll in one of the health plans oﬀered by their former employer.
This is equivalent to treating the waive option and the three plans as being in two distinct
“nests” and estimating the choice within the plan nest.13
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Table 4 presents coeﬃcient estimates from the conditional logit model. The ﬁrst column is
for the full sample, in which married and single retirees are pooled. In columns 2 and 3, the
sample is stratiﬁed by marital status.
Since the option of waiving coverage is treated as the baseline alternative, the coeﬃcients
on the interactions of individual characteristics and the plan dummies are interpreted as the
eﬀect of a characteristic on the probability of choosing the particular plan relative to the
probability of waiving coverage. Thus, the fact that all the coeﬃcients for the interactions
with the under 65 dummy variable are positive means that pre-Medicare retirees are more
likely to accept coverage than those over age 65. Because for all three plans the beneﬁts
do not change when someone enrolls in Medicare, I interpret this result to reﬂect the high
premiums and other barriers faced by the near elderly in the market for non-group health
insurance. Conditional on Medicare coverage, in the married subsample the demand for
PPO coverage increases with age, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of previous studies
(Feldman et al. 1989; Barringer and Mitchell 1994; Cutler and Reber 1998; Royalty and
Solomon 1999; Buchmueller 2000). These age eﬀects, however, are imprecisely estimated;
most of the coeﬃcients do not achieve conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
The pattern of the coeﬃcients on the marital status and gender interactions suggest that
married men are more likely to take up coverage than married women, while gender diﬀer-
ences among single retirees are not statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with previous
research on the take-up behavior of active workers (Buchmueller 1996/1997). Retirees living
outside of metropolitan areas are more likely to choose PPO coverage than to either decline
coverage or enroll in an HMO.14
In all models, the estimated coeﬃcient on the out-of-pocket premium is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant at the .01 level. The price coeﬃcient is larger in absolute value for
single retirees than for married retirees. Beyond this, the coeﬃcients themselves are not
14Note that each HMO option only appears in an individual’s choice set if the plan is truly an option–i.e.,
if the person lives in the plan’s service area.14
useful for gauging the magnitude of the price eﬀect or comparing eﬀects across samples.
Therefore, I calculate two quantities that give a sense of the magnitude of the price eﬀect:
“enrollee perspective” premium elasticities15 and the predicted change in market share caused
by a $5 increase in premiums. For the conditional logit model, the own-price elasticity of




= ¯Pj(1 ¡ Probj); (2)
where ¯ is the price coeﬃcient, Pj is the price of plan option j and Probj is the probability
that j is chosen. The fact that the elasticity depends on plan prices and market shares means
that a given model will generate diﬀerent elasticity estimates for diﬀerent plans.16 Therefore,
it is necessary to be careful in making comparisons across studies as diﬀerences in elasticities
may be driven not only by real diﬀerences in price sensitivity but also by diﬀerences in
average prices facing consumers. The predicted loss of market share is less sensitive to the
level of observed prices. It is calculated by predicting for each observation the probability
of choosing a plan at given prices and the probability of choosing that plan if its premium
increased by $5 while the price of all other plans remained constant. The diﬀerence between
these two predictions is calculated for each person and then averaged over the estimation
sample.
The elasticity estimates and their standard errors are reported in the ﬁrst two columns
of Table 5. In the third column is the mean change in the probability of choosing each
option brought about by the $5 price increase. The last column expresses this eﬀect as a
percent of the initial market share. For the full sample, the elasticities range from -0.14 to
-0.37 depending on the plan. Evaluated at the overall sample means, the estimated enrollee
perspective elasticity is -0.27 with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval of [-0.38, -0.17]. Using
15The enrollee perspective elasticity is based on the out-of-pocket prices faced by enrollees–i.e., the total
premium less the employer contribution. Evaluating the same price eﬀect at the total premium charged by
the health plan results in a much larger elasticity. I discuss this below.
16I calculate the elasticities at the sample means for each plan and at the overall sample means for the
estimation. An alternative approach is to calculate individual-level elasticities using the prices facing each
observation and the predicted probability of choosing each plan and then take the average over the estimation
sample. The two techniques yield similar results.15
the full premium rather than the out-of-pocket price actually faced by retirees yields an
“insurer perspective” elasticity of -3.3. The simulations indicate that a $5 price increase
(holding constant the price of competing plans) reduces the probability that a plan is chosen
by between 0.002 and 0.008. Relative to predicted probabilities using observed prices, this
represents a loss of market share of between 1.3% and 3%.
The results for the married subsample are quite similar, which is not surprising given that
roughly three-quarters of the full sample is married. The price eﬀects are stronger for single
retirees. For singles, a $5 price increase is predicted to reduce enrollment by an average of 1.5
percentage points. Relative to the mean baseline market share among singles, this represents
a decline of 4.5%. Combining the parameter estimates from the single sample regressions
with the mean premium for single coverage yields an insurer perspective elasticity of -3.5.
5.2 Alternative Speciﬁcations of the Choice Set
The stronger price eﬀect for single retirees may be due to the fact that switching plans is
more costly for two people rather than one. Alternatively, this result could simply be due
to the fact that the choice among plans, which is the only decision facing single retirees, is
more sensitive to price than the decision to cover a dependent spouse, which is incorporated
into the price eﬀect in the married sample. To test for this possibility, I estimate a set of
models that for married retirees conditions on the choice of coverage tier. That is, similar to
previous studies, I treat a married individual’s choice between single and two party coverage
as exogenous and then model the choice among the diﬀerent plans within each person’s
chosen coverage tier.
The key results from these regressions are reported in Table 6. The price coeﬃcient,
elasticities and simulated market share eﬀects are quite close to the ones reported in Tables
4 and 5, indicating that for married retirees price has a similar eﬀect on the choice among
plans and the decision to take two-party rather than single coverage. This implies that the
diﬀerence between married and single retirees represents a diﬀerence in behavior, rather than
an artifact of the model.
As noted, another diﬀerence between the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 and those
from previous studies is that the previous studies do not include the decision to waive16
coverage in the choice set. Therefore, I also estimate models on the subset of people who
elect to take coverage. For the sake of brevity, I do not report these models in a separate
table, but instead describe them here.
For married couples, conditioning on take-up does not change the results. The price
coeﬃcient is -0.0077, which is essentially identical to the estimate from the baseline model
(-0.0074). The two models imply similar elasticities and the same loss of market share
associated with a price increase. For single retirees, the estimated price eﬀects are larger
when the sample is limited to people taking up coverage. The elasticity (averaged over all
plans) is -0.490, compared to the elasticity of -0.325 reported in Table 5. This pattern is
consistent with other research showing that for active employees the decision to take up
coverage oﬀered by an employer is less sensitive to price than the choice among a set of plans
conditional on having some coverage.17
5.3 Additional Sensitivity Tests
To test the sensitivity of the results, I estimate the conditional logit model on a number of
alternative samples. First, I cut the sample in diﬀerent ways by retirement date. This is
important given that price diﬀerences across the three retirement cohorts are an important
source of identifying variation. First, I drop individuals who retired before January 1988.
This leaves a sample in which nearly everyone faces a higher price for the PPO compared to
the HMOs, though the size of that diﬀerential varies. Many, though not all, individuals in
this sample face diﬀerent prices for the two HMOs. I also estimate a set of regressions on
a sample that excludes the post-1993 cohort of retirees. In this case, the main contrast is
between pre-1988 retirees, for whom all plans are free, and later retirees who face a higher
price for the PPO and, in some cases, diﬀerences in prices between the two HMOs. The
results for these two sub-samples (available upon request) are quite similar to the results for
the full sample.
Next, I consider the eﬀects of limiting the sample to retirees over the age of 65. The
results are robust to this change as well. A $5 increase in premiums is predicted to reduce a
plan’s enrollment by 2%. This is only slightly smaller than the 2.8% market share reduction
17See, for example, Cutler (2003) and Gruber and Washington (2005).17
predicted for the full sample. Since excluding pre-Medicare retirees eliminates a diﬀerent
source of price variation, this provides another check on the identiﬁcation strategy.
Finally, to test for the stability of the price eﬀects over time, I cut the data by year,
estimating separate models for the periods 1997-1999 and 2000-2002. The estimated price
coeﬃcients for the two periods are essentially identical.
5.4 Comparisons with Previous Studies
These results can be put in perspective by comparing them to estimated price eﬀects from
other studies. The most direct comparisons are with the two studies on the health plan
choices of retirees. In my earlier study on UC retirees, which modelled the demand for
PPO coverage, the mean PPO market share was 51% and the mean out-of-pocket premium
for that option was $64 in 2002 dollars. The corresponding ﬁgures for this data set are
almost identical: 51% of retirees electing coverage chose the PPO option and the mean PPO
premium was $62. These similarities in price and market share make it straightforward to
compare elasticities. The main diﬀerence between the two studies is that in the current
study there is much more price variation, including price diﬀerences for the diﬀerent HMO
options. Since in the earlier study I conditioned on coverage tier, the most appropriate
results for making comparisons are those reported in Table 6. For this model, the estimated
elasticity for the PPO plan is -0.21. In the UC study, the full sample elasticity is slightly
lower than this (-0.14), though within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the current estimate
[-0.30 to -0.12].
The premiums observed in this data set are higher than in the data used by Atherly,
Dowd and Feldman (2004), where the mean premium is $10.17 and Dowd, Feldman and
Coulam (2003), where the mean is $8.16. This diﬀerence largely explains why their estimated
elasticities (-.13 and -.14) are slightly lower than the ones found here. When compared in
terms of the eﬀect of a small price increase, the results look more similar. In my full sample,
a $5 increase in premiums is predicted to reduce a plan’s market share by an average of
0.004. The corresponding estimate from Atherly et al. is 0.003. This similarity suggests
that in their study the bias from unmeasured plan attributes is not large.
The estimated price eﬀects from this study are at the lower end of the results of studies18
based on non-elderly active employees, though they are not substantially diﬀerent than those
earlier results (and the conﬁdence intervals overlap). Recall that Cutler and Reber (1998)
estimate premium elasticities of -0.3 and -0.6. Measured relative to the full premiums in
their sample, their price eﬀects correspond to an insurer perspective elasticity of -2, which
is smaller than the insurer perspective elasticities implied by my results.
In terms of similarities in research design, the cleanest comparison is with the paper
by Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein (2002), which provides estimated price eﬀects for
diﬀerent groups of active UC employees. They estimate conditional logit models using the
full set of plans available to UC employees–a FFS plan, a PPO and several HMOs–and on
a subsample that excludes individuals in the FFS plan. The full sample results are similar
to those here: a $5 increase in premiums is predicted to reduce a plan’s market share by 3%
and the insurer-perspective elasticity ranges from -0.8 to -5.2, depending on plan, with an
average of -2.5. However, the restricted choice set consisting only of managed care plans is
more similar to the choice set in the current data. Those regressions imply stronger price
eﬀects: an insurer-perspective elasticity of -5.3 and a 7.6% loss of market share in response
to a $5 price increase.
5.5 Implications for Policy and Research
These results have implications for the incentives that health plans would face if Medicare
were restructured as a managed competition program. While the enrollee perspective elastic-
ities may seem small, the insurer perspective elasticities and simulated market share eﬀects
indicate that health plans that raise premiums while their competitors hold premiums con-
stant will lose a nontrivial share of their enrollment. The similarity between my results and
those based on data from Harvard University and the UC suggests that the experiences of
those employers are, in fact, relevant to Medicare. In both of those cases, the adoption of a
ﬁxed dollar premium contribution led to a reduction in health spending. Spending fell not
only because employees shifted to lower cost plans but because participating plans responded
to this shift by reducing premiums (Cutler and Reber 1998; Buchmueller 1998). Taken to-
gether, the results from this and earlier studies provides some support for the arguments19
made by proponents of market-oriented reforms.18
The vigor with which plans compete on price will depend on how exactly the program
is structured. If payments to plans are not fully risk adjusted, plans will have an incen-
tive to attract healthier than average enrollees. To the extent that the price elasticity of
demand is greater for healthier enrollees than for those in poor health, as has been found
in previous studies, the incentive to compete on price will be even stronger. Put another
way, the premium elasticities I estimate represent average eﬀects, which understate the price
sensitivity of those enrollees that plans are most interested in attracting. Further research
on the relationship between health status and price sensitivity among Medicare beneﬁciaries
– which also has implications for risk selection and market stability – would be valuable.
It is very useful for policy analysts to have evidence from a number of diﬀerent settings and
estimates based on diﬀerent sources of variation. This is particularly true in the literature
on health plan choice since most studies use data from a single employer. The fact that
the elasticity estimates in this study are similar to those from other studies using diﬀerent
data sources is therefore important. Modelling the impact of a major policy change such
as Medicare reform requires many assumptions which introduce signiﬁcant uncertainty. The
tight range of premium elasticity estimates that has emerged from this literature suggests
that this parameter is not a major source of uncertainty.
In addition to its relevance to Medicare policy, the results of this study have implications
for research on the determinants of consumer health plan choice decisions. In multiple option
health insurance programs, consumers make choices along several margins. In addition to
the choice among competing plans there is the decision to take up coverage at all and for
married individuals there is also the decision to cover dependents. This study is the ﬁrst
in the literature to jointly consider the eﬀect of price on all of these margins. The results
18Several caveats concerning this conclusion should be noted. First, it is not clear from those earlier
studies whether adopting a managed competition approach aﬀected the growth in spending or simply led to
a one-time savings. In addition, applying this model to Medicare would involve signiﬁcant transition costs,
which were not an issue in those employer-sponsored programs. Plus, competition among multiple managed
care plans may not be feasible in less densely populated parts of the country. Even where competition is
feasible, there may not be a political willingness to expose traditional fee-for-service Medicare to competition,
as occurred in the Harvard and UC examples. As a result, even if adopting the principles of managed
competition did lead to more price competition in certain markets, the ultimate eﬀect on Medicare spending
is unclear. These details, while important, are beyond the scope of this study.20
suggest that for married retirees price has a similar eﬀect on the decision to take up coverage,
the decision to cover a spouse and the choice among plans. As a consequence, models that
condition either on the decision to accept coverage or the decision of whether or not to cover
a dependent spouse yield similar price elasticities as a model that treats these two decisions
as endogenous. For single retirees, the take-up decision is less sensitive to price than the
choice among plans conditional on take-up. However, the diﬀerence is small. Therefore,
models that condition on take-up and models that treat the decision to decline coverage as
part of the choice set yield similar qualitative results.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Prominent Medicare reform proposals call for a greater reliance on price-sensitive consumer
demand as a force for driving competition and controlling costs. The premium elasticity
of demand is a key parameter for understanding how Medicare beneﬁciaries would behave
under such reforms. While previous studies provide elasticity estimates, this literature has
important shortcomings. The studies with the strongest research design focus on younger,
active employees, while the studies of older retirees have potentially important methodolog-
ical limitations.
In this paper I provide estimates of health insurance premium elasticities that are directly
relevant for understanding how Medicare beneﬁciaries would behave in a managed competi-
tion setting. I extend the literature by analyzing retirees rather than active employees and
by using a quasi-experimental research design that exploits exogenous variation in health
plan premiums. This research design produces more credible elasticity estimates than those
derived from previous studies. The ﬁndings indicate that retirees do consider price when
choosing among competing health plans and are willing to switch plans when relative prices
change. The eﬀect of out-of-pocket premiums on the health plan choice decision is negative,
statistically signiﬁcant, and very robust to diﬀerent modelling strategies. For most estima-
tion samples the implied enrollee perspective premium elasticity falls between -0.2 and -0.3.
The regression results imply that a health plan that increased its premium by $5 while its
competitors held their prices constant would lose between 2% and 4% of its enrollees.21
The results of this and other studies suggest that health plans competing in a reformed
Medicare program will face considerable pressure to compete on price. Additional research at
the level of the health plan would provide further insight on how exactly plans would compete
under the incentives of a premium support program. The Medicare Modernization Act of
2003 included provisions that would establish competitive bidding demonstration projects in
several markets. While the history of such projects in Medicare is not promising—all previous
demonstrations were cancelled before going into eﬀect—these projects have the potential
to provide important evidence on how health plans compete in a managed competition
environment.22
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1048.Table 1.  Summary of Monthly Premium Contributions, 2002 
 
      
  PPO HMO-A  HMO-B  Decline 
Retired Before 1/88        
  Single Coverage, Medicare  0.00  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
  Single Coverage, Pre-Medicare  0.00  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
           
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Medicare  0.00  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, One Medicare  0.00  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Pre-Medicare  0.00  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
 
Retired 1/88 to 1/93 
     
  Single Coverage, Medicare  50.24  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
  Single Coverage, Pre-Medicare  65.49  42.00  38.25  -75.00 
           
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Medicare  144.81  0.00  0.00  -75.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, One Medicare  160.06  42.00  38.25  -75.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Pre-Medicare  160.06  104.75  93.82  -75.00 
 
Retired After 1993, 20 Years of Service 
     
  Single Coverage, Medicare  97.14  20.00  14.60  -60.00 
  Single Coverage, Pre-Medicare  109.34  75.65  69.03  -60.00 
           
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Medicare  229.13  40.00  29.20  -60.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, One Medicare  244.12  95.65  85.55  -60.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Pre-Medicare  256.32  172.11  153.28  -60.00 
 
Retired After 1993, 10 Years of Service 
     
  Single Coverage, Medicare  190.93  60.00  43.80  -30.00 
  Single Coverage, Pre-Medicare  197.03  142.96  130.40  -30.00 
           
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Medicare  427.76  120.00  87.60  -30.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, One Medicare  442.78  202.96  179.95  -30.00 
   Retiree + Spouse, Both Pre-Medicare  448.85  306.84  273.21  -30.00 
        
 Table 2.  Retiree Characteristics by Retirement Date 
 
  By Retirement Date 
 










% Married  46.41%  71.81%  69.78%  75.67% 
% Male  51.32  74.13  70.65  70.11 
% Surviving spouse  35.58  16.47  9.89  4.24 
% Remaining in state  90.99  88.86  86.04  88.33 
% Living in non-metro county  25.75  29.58  38.92  43.37 
 
ZIP-level median income,  









        
Number of Observations  1,099  862  1,254  1,114 
Number of Retirees  222  174  258  292 
        
 
 Table 3.  The Distribution of Health Plan Enrollment by Retirement Cohort, 2002 
 
    By Retirement Date 
   
Full Sample 
 
1/86 to 1/88 
 
1/88 to 1/93 
 
After  1/93 











   HMO A  13.12  11.25  9.66  17.01 











      
 









Notes: Figures are for retirees observed in 2002.  The sample sizes are not the same as in Table 2 because 
that table includes all retirees observed in any year. 
 
 Table 4.  Conditional Logit Coefficients: Retirees Age 60 and Older 
 







Premium -0.0074  -0.0065  -0.0181 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0060) 
Two Party Coverage  2.182  2.132   
 (0.170)  (0.169)   
Married      
    x PPO   -1.558     
 (0.398)     
    x HMO A  -2.358     
 (0.463)     
    x HMO B  -1.766     
 (0.435)     
Age (in years)       
    x PPO   0.054  0.132  -0.045 
 (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
    x HMO A  0.003  0.088  -0.010 
 (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.088) 
    x HMO B  -0.078  0.022  -0.220 
 (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.074) 
Age < 65 (0,1)       
    x PPO   0.392  0.678  0.443 
 (0.336)  (0.386)  (0.658) 
    x HMO A  0.454  0.772  0.495 
 (0.439)  (0.512)  (0.830) 
    x HMO B  0.407  1.084  -0.668 
 (0.397)  (0.381)  (0.794) 
Male      
    x PPO   1.054  1.084  0.995 
 (0.344)  (0.381)  (0.644) 
    x HMO A  0.791  1.071  0.356 
 (0.422)  (0.523)  (0.774) 
    x HMO B  0.684  0.736  0.672 
 (0.376)  (0.411)  (0.726) 
Surviving Spouse       
    x PPO   1.071    1.123 
 (0.558)    (0.626) 
    x HMO A  -0.506    -0.862 
 (0.728)    (0.808) 
    x HMO B  -0.536    -0.670 
      (0.676)    (0.761) 
Table ContinuesTable 4.  Continued. 
 
 
ZIP Code level Average Income 
    
    x PPO   0.0160  0.023  0.015 
 (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.032) 
    x HMO A  -0.007  0.012  -0.063 
 (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.040) 
    x HMO B  0.000  0.015  -0.037 
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.034) 
Non-Metropolitan County       
    x PPO   1.539  1.269  2.704 
 (0.318)  (0.374)  (0.805) 
    x HMO A  0.152  0.026  0.859 
 (0.469)  (0.545)  (1.001) 
    x HMO B  0.346  0.015  1.777 
 (0.388)  (0.434)  (1.036) 
Number of Observations  3206  2383  823 
Log Likelihood  -3430.64  -2734.14  -654.084 
Notes: The choice set includes available health plans plus the option of waiving coverage, which is 
treated as the omitted option.  For married retirees single and two-party coverage are treated as separate 
options.  Huber-White standard errors (in parentheses) account for the fact that there are multiple 
observations per individual.  All models include main effects for each plan (3 variables) and interactions 
with year dummies (15 variables).  The surviving spouse dummy is excluded from the married sample 
regressions because surviving spouses do not have the option of two-party coverage. Table 5.  Estimated Price Effects 
 
    




change in market 
share 
as a % of initial 
market share 
All Retirees      
    PPO, Single  -0.215  
(0.042) 
-0.004 -2.87% 
    PPO, Two-party  -0.361  
(0.071) 
-0.007 -1.87% 
    HMO A, Single  -0.161  
(0.032) 
-0.002 -3.35% 
    HMO A, Two-party  -0.375  
(0.074) 
-0.004 -3.11% 
    HMO B, Single  -0.140  
(0.028) 
-0.003 -3.19% 
    HMO B, Two-party   -0.255  
(0.050) 
-0.008 -2.34% 
Average over all Plans  -0.272  
(0.054) 
-0.004 -2.78% 
Married Retirees      
    PPO, Single  -0.196  
(0.045) 
-0.002 -2.92% 
    PPO, Two-party  -0.317  
(0.072) 
-0.006 -1.64% 
    HMO A, Single  -0.147  
(0.033) 
-0.001 -3.12% 
    HMO A, Two-party  -0.329  
(0.075) 
-0.004 -2.74% 
    HMO B, Single  -0.132  
(0.030) 
-0.002 -3.01% 
    HMO B, Two-party   -0.224  
(0.051) 
-0.007 -2.06% 
Average over all Plans  -0.264  
(0.060) 
-0.004 -2.54% 
Single Retirees      
    PPO  -0.305  
(0.102) 
-0.013 -3.89% 
    HMO A  -0.341 
(0.114) 
-0.015 -6.77% 
    HMO B  -0.268 
(0.114) 
-0.017 -6.05% 
Average over all Plans  -0.325 
(0.108) 
-0.015 -5.29% 
Notes: Price effects are based on the conditional logit results reported in Table 4.  Elasticities are 
calculated at the mean price and market share for each plan in each estimation sample.  Standard errors 
for the elasticity estimates are presented in parentheses.  The effect of a $5 price increase is the estimated 
loss of market share for a plan that raises its premium by $5 while other plan premiums remain constant.  
It is calculated for each observation and then averaged over the estimation sample.     Table 6.  Plan Choice Conditional on Coverage Tier: Estimated Price Effects 
 
           
      Effect of a $5 Price Increase 






as a % of initial 
market share 




    PPO    -0.212  
(0.047) 
-0.005 -1.44% 
    HMO A    -0.248  
(0.055) 
-0.005 -2.75% 
    HMO B    -0.168  
(0.037) 
-0.007 -2.06% 
Average over all Plans    -0.224  
(0.050) 
-0.006 -1.98% 




    PPO    -0.194  
(0.055) 
-0.004 -1.14% 
    HMO A    -0.231  
(0.066) 
-0.004 -2.29% 
    HMO B    -0.175  
(0.050) 
-0.006 -1.57% 
Average over all Plans    -0.205  
(0.058) 
-0.004 -1.57% 
Notes: The choice set includes available health plans plus the option of waiving coverage.  The decision 
of whether or not to cover a dependent spouse is treated as exogenous.  Huber-White standard errors (in 
parentheses) account for the fact that there are multiple observations per individual.  Independent 
variables are the same as in Table 4.  Elasticities are calculated at the mean price and market share for 
each plan in each estimation sample.  The effect of a $5 price increase is the estimated loss of market 
share for a plan that raises its premium by $5 while other plan premiums remain constant.  It is calculated 
for each observation and then averaged over the estimation sample.   
 
 